This book examines the politics of revenue bargaining in Africa at a time when attention to domestic revenue mobilization has expanded immensely. Measures to increase taxes and other revenues can - but do not always - lead to a process of bargaining, where revenue providers negotiate for some kind of return. This book offers in-depth analyses of micro-instances of revenue bargaining across five African countries: Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo, and Uganda. The case studies all draw on a common theoretical framework combining the fiscal contract theory with the political settlement approach, which enables a systematic exploration into what triggers revenue bargaining; how these processes unfold; and finally, if and when they result in an agreement - whether that is a fiscal contract or not. From these empirically rich case narratives emerges a story of how power and initial bargaining position influence not only whether bargaining occurs in the first place, but also the processes and their outcomes. Less resourceful taxpayers find it harder to raise their voice, but in some cases even these groups manage to ally with other civil society groups to protest tax reforms they perceive as unfair. Indirect taxes such as VAT often trigger protests, as do sudden changes in tax practices. Revenue providers rarely call for improved services in return for paying tax, which would be expected to nurture the foundation for a fiscal social contract. Instead, revenue providers are more likely to negotiate for tax reductions, implying that governments' efforts to increase revenue are impeded. Indeed, we find many instances of state-society reciprocity when ruling elites try to be responsive to revenue providers' demands. The Politics of Revenue Bargaining in Africa hence provides insights into the nature and dynamics not only of revenue bargaining but of policymaking in general as well as its implications for state-society reciprocity in Africa.
