Dissatisfaction with the working of courts is ubiquitous. Legal inertia and maladministration are the norm in many countries and have significant social and economic repercussions. No longer a theme relegated to the peripheries of economic analysis, the administration of justice is now recognised by most economists as being of fundamental importance for economic development, a factor increasingly being acknowledged by policymakers at all levels. The departure point for this book is the authors’ belief in the need for a systematic analysis of the incentive structures facing key players in the courts and litigation process. They focus not only on structures pertaining to the common law tradition, but offer analysis of issues not normally found in the North-American literature, such as the Latin notary and the selection and values of judges in civil law systems. They further propose an ample list of considerations for a reform agenda.
Offering a comprehensive look at the incentives facing many key players in the administration of justice, this book should be of great interest to law and economics scholars, civil law professors, legal reformers, international development institutions and law students mindful of the need to improve the functioning of courts.
